REVISED AND UPDATED 20 FEBRUARY 2009

2.8   AIDING AND ABETTING

"Before you can convict A of aiding and abetting B to commit the offence of ... you must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt:

  1. That B committed the offence;
  2. That A knew at the time what B was doing (though not necessarily that it was an offence);
  3. (That A was present at the commission of the offence and helped B to commit it)
    or
    (That A, with the intention of helping B to commit the offence, was near enough to help should the need arise, (eg by keeping watch etc) and that B knew that A was available to help him;)
    or
    (That A was present at or very near the commission of the offence and both intended to encourage B to commit it and deliberately did encourage him to commit it.

    To prove aiding and abetting by encouragement the prosecution must prove that A intended to encourage and deliberately did encourage B to commit the offence. The mere voluntary presence of A at the scene of the offence is not in itself enough. But the fact that he was there, voluntarily and deliberately, watching the commission of the offence and doing nothing to prevent it, even though he could have done so, or to indicate his disapproval of what B was doing, may be strong evidence upon which you could conclude that he intended to and did encourage and so aided and abetted B in the commission of the offence.)"
  4. (Where the act of assistance was done in advance of the crime and the crime was committed in the defendant’s absence then the following may be appropriate.

"Before you can convict A of aiding and abetting B to commit the offence of ... you must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt:

  1. that B committed the offence; and
  2. that the assistance given by A did assist B to commit that crime; and
  3. at the time A gave assistance to B he foresaw as a real possibility that B would commit that offence; and
  4. that A deliberately gave assistance to B realising that it was capable of assisting B to commit that crime.

NOTE.

(1)   Illustrate with one or more examples relevant to the type of offence charged.

(2)   Though the principles governing liability as an aider and abettor are the same whatever the offence, it is usually necessary to consider their application in the context of the primary offence.

(3)   This direction will be appropriate to those cases where a defendant is expressly charged with aiding and abetting, rather than where he is jointly indicted as a principal by virtue of the doctrine of joint enterprise. In the latter case a direction based upon 2.7 Joint enterprise will be appropriate.


ARCHBOLD 2010: 17-68 to 73 and 18-9 to 18-19

BLACKSTONE 2010: A 5.1 to 15